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Provider Behavior Under Global Budgeting 
and Policy Responses: An Observational 
Study on Eye Care Services in Taiwan
Chao-Kai Chang, MD, PhD1,2, Sudha Xirasagar, MBBS, PhD3, Brian Chen, JD, PhD3, 
James R. Hussey, PhD3, I-Jong Wang, MD, PhD4, Jen-Chieh Chen, PhD4, and Ie-Bin 
Lian, PhD5
Abstract
Third-party payer systems are consistently associated with health care cost escalation. Taiwan’s single-payer, universal 
coverage National Health Insurance (NHI) adopted global budgeting (GB) to achieve cost control. This study captures 
ophthalmologists’ response to GB, specifically service volume changes and service substitution between low-revenue and 
high-revenue services following GB implementation, the subsequent Bureau of NHI policy response, and the policy impact. 
De-identified eye clinic claims data for the years 2000, 2005, and 2007 were analyzed to study the changes in Simple Claim 
Form (SCF) claims versus Special Case Claims (SCCs). The 3 study years represent the pre-GB period, post-GB but prior to 
region-wise service cap implementation period, and the post-service cap period, respectively. Repeated measures multilevel 
regression analysis was used to study the changes adjusting for clinic characteristics and competition within each health 
care market. SCF service volume (low-revenue, fixed-price patient visits) remained constant throughout the study period, 
but SCCs (covering services involving variable provider effort and resource use with flexibility for discretionary billing) 
increased in 2005 with no further change in 2007. The latter is attributable to a 30% cap negotiated by the NHI Bureau with 
the ophthalmology association and enforced by the association. This study demonstrates that GB deployed with ongoing 
monitoring and timely policy responses that are designed in collaboration with professional stakeholders can contain costs 
in a health insurance–financed health care system.
Keywords
global budgeting, game theory, provider behavior
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Introduction
Background
Third-party payers have continuously innovated with pay-
ment mechanisms to overcome cost escalations resulting 
from consumer moral hazard and demand induction by pro-
viders. In the United States, the initial dominance 
of cost-plus reimbursement has successively given way to 
per-diem reimbursement, fixed-rate diagnosis-related group 
payments, capitation, and most recently, under the Affordable 
Care Act, population health-driven accountable care organi-
zations. Capitation-based reimbursement systems are com-
plex to manage and unpopular among both providers and 
patients, particularly in health systems where patients are 
accustomed to free choice of providers. These issues have 
led to the increasing use of global budgeting (GB), a popula-
tion-based expenditure cap that accommodates a fee-for- 
service base in apportioning payments to providers. Germany 
was among the earliest to introduce global budgets with 
expenditure caps in 1992 for physician visits, and subse-
quently for hospital services.1 The Netherlands also has a 
well-established global budget system.2
Taiwan implemented a National Health Insurance (NHI) 
system in 1995, mandating universal coverage under a sin-
gle-payer system. It experienced rapid escalation in health 
care expenditures, which increased at an annual rate of 
6.26% from 1995 to 2001 despite annual population growth 
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of only 5.2% during this period.3 Premium revenues increased 
by 4.26% annually, causing repeated financial crises.3 The 
cost escalation under NHI is largely due to increasing use of 
high-tech care (eg, 80% increase in dialysis visits between 
1994 and 20003), increased intensity of care within care epi-
sodes, and increased lengths of stay.4 The cost escalation 
continued even after annual rates of per capita health care 
encounters stabilized following the spurt in the first NHI 
year. Increases in volume and care intensity under NHI are 
documented in several studies. Compared with 1994 (pre-
NHI), the year 2000 (5 years since NHI implementation) 
showed a 16.6% increase in total outpatient visits and a 
19.7% increase in inpatient surgeries.3 These increases were 
almost entirely accounted for by an initial spurt in utilization 
by the (pre-NHI) uninsured 43% of the population.5 The pre-
NHI insured population had annual outpatient visit rates of 
12 per capita both pre-NHI and in the first year of NHI. This 
is exactly the visit rate observed among the previously unin-
sured on becoming newly insured.5 Other studies document 
the general population-wide stabilization of outpatient visit 
rates following the first post-NHI year, fluctuating between 
12.2 visits in 1997 and 12.7 visits in 2000.6 The slight 
increase in visits is attributed to the increase in the insured 
population from 92% in 1997 to 96% in 2000, and popula-
tion aging.3
Unsustainable cost escalations led to sector-wise GB, 
beginning with dental clinics in 1998, Chinese medicine 
clinics in 2000, Western medicine clinics in 2001, and hospi-
tals in 2002. A global budget GB is an overall spending limit 
to control aggregate health care spending in a health plan, 
service sector, or health care institution.7 This study was 
designed to assess clinical providers’ response to GB in 
terms of service volume changes and substitution of high-
revenue services for low-revenue services, and later changes 
in provider behavior in response to the Bureau of NHI 
(BNHI) policy of imposing service caps. We used eye care 
service changes to study provider behavior.
Unlike capitation that limits patient choice of providers, 
GB targets providers, requiring them to either restrict care, or 
accept price reductions if the collective service volume 
exceeds the normative volume assumed in setting the budget. 
GB is a documented cost-containment mechanism that does 
not directly alienate the population, as illustrated in the 
Canadian8-10 and German health care systems.11,12
In Taiwan, each sectoral global budget is allocated among 
the six BNHI administrative regions. Region-wise GB allo-
cations for the clinic sector were set in 2001 based on popu-
lation, age/gender composition, standardized mortality ratio, 
and historic share of health care expenditures. The initial 
allocation is annually adjusted based on anticipated changes 
in demographic profile.13 Each BNHI branch pays providers 
quarterly, based on the monetary value of a point calculated 
by pooling provider claim points in the BNHI region and 
dividing the expenditure cap by the total claimed points. 
Providers are reimbursed based on their individual claim 
points. A point is a standardized unit of service or care item, 
used as the currency for all claims. It has a base value of 
NT$1 (New Taiwan dollar) set in 2001 when the clinic sector 
GB commenced. The point value is inversely proportional to 
the total service volume in the region, fluctuating quarterly 
with the conversion factor (CF)14 floating up or down. 
Service volumes exceeding the region’s cap result in reduced 
reimbursement rates per unit of service for all providers. 
Specifically, provider reimbursement in NT dollars is calcu-
lated as follows: GB
i 
= qi × ∑
j
 (pijQij), where i is the sector, 
q
i
 is the CF for the point value for the sector, p
ij
 is the “price” 
(in points) of service item j, and Q
ij
 is the quantity of service. 
Because GB reimburses individually claimed points using a 
fee-for-service schedule while applying an expenditure cap, 
economic theory predicts that providers have an incentive to 
escalate their own service volume to protect their share of the 
GB pie.
Anticipating unnecessary service provision by clinics 
seeking to increase their respective market shares, the BNHI 
introduced concurrent policies to monitor provider volumes 
and audit providers who exceed historic service volumes.14 
The top 10% of providers by point volume are subjected to 
administrative review by annually appointed medical teams 
nominated by the regional medical societies. A random sam-
ple of claims is reviewed for care appropriateness, and ques-
tionable claims are deducted from the provider’s total claims 
(points neutralized) up to a maximum of 10%. Providers who 
are not in the top 10% by volume suffer a 1% to 3% neutral-
ization of points for disproportionate increases over the pre-
vious year. This policy restrains providers with large market 
shares from crowding out smaller providers through market 
power. Underserved areas with health professional shortages 
are exempt from this policy.
The documented effects of GB in Taiwan are increased 
inpatient volumes following hospital GB,5,15 and increased 
outpatient volumes following clinic sector GB.16 These stud-
ies examined total care volumes without the exploration of 
care intensity or substitution of services by providers. Such 
studies require specialty-specific data to identify changes in 
services categorized by care intensity. The present study 
examines the service provision behavior of clinic ophthal-
mologists under GB. In Taiwan, clinic doctors are not per-
mitted to additionally work at hospitals and vice versa. 
Physicians of eye care clinics are reimbursed either through 
a Simple Claim Form (SCF) or Special Case Claim (SCC). 
SCF is reimbursed with a low, fixed price for a routine bun-
dle of services, generally a routine office visit or prescription 
drugs dispensing not exceeding 3 days). An SCC is an item-
ized claim with potential for discretionary billing, usually 
used for procedure-based care involving variable provider 
effort, technology, consumables, or non-routine medicines.
Despite administrative policies to restrain unnecessary 
services, physicians possess expert power advantage to 
selectively over-provide high-revenue services while remain-
ing in compliance with BNHI policies. As an administrative 
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third-party payer, BNHI can do little to selectively rein in 
care provision. We examine GB impacts on both volume and 
composition of eye care services, fixed-price, low-revenue 
SCF services versus discretionary billable SCC services. In 
Taiwan, a physician can choose to be either office based or 
hospital based but not both. The clinic sector was studied 
because of separate GBs for the clinic and hospital sector, 
and because typically most eye services are ambulatory even 
when provided by a hospital.
The response to a change from fixed-rate fee-for-service 
to a GB system with a variable point value is similar to a 
non-zero-sum game. Game theory posits that participants 
choose actions that maximize their utility considering the 
choices of others. An expenditure cap should incentivize pro-
viders to restrict output to maximize the revenue from each 
service. In other words, total income may be maximized at a 
lower service volume if each point (CF) is worth more. 
However, in a context of limited, shared resources (such as a 
prospectively fixed budget with no control on individual pro-
vider volumes), individuals can increase income at the 
expense of others or maintain a target income by raising their 
own service volume and increasing market share even if the 
per-service revenue is reduced. Each individual realizes that 
the most rational choice for all other players is to increase 
output, causing all players to increase their own output, even 
though it will lead to a decline in the average reimbursement 
rate for all players. This scenario is described as the tragedy 
of the commons,17 a multi-player version of a standard game, 
the prisoners’ dilemma. In the context of eye services in a GB 
environment, providers faced with a choice between SCC 
and SCF may be incentivized to maximize their billable 
points by increasing SCC services relative to SCF. The only 
penalty for increasing point volume is the neutralization of 
excess points. However, from a social welfare perspective, 
there may be an actual social welfare loss. The floating point 
value may decline so precipitously due to greatly increased 
service volumes, that the marginal cost of providing an extra 
service may exceed its marginal revenue. This may result in 
substandard service using inadequate or inferior resources, 
thereby compromising quality. Furthermore, to the extent 
that the services were unnecessary, patients are exposed to 
increased risk of iatrogenic injury or adverse drug reactions, 
a socially harmful outcome even though budget neutral for 
the BNHI. Recognizing the potential for harm, BNHI imple-
mented a major policy in 2005-2006, setting a 30% ceiling 
on SCC points out of each clinic’s total claim.18 This study 
will also investigate the impact of this payer-initiated policy 
on service volume and composition.
The present study explores two research questions based 
on the conceptual framework and regulatory change. The 
first research question examines whether clinic sector GB, 
effective 2001, was associated with a post-GB increase in 
service volumes, particularly high-revenue SCC services 
relative to low-revenue SCF services. At any point in time, 
the total patient market (population) is fixed, and provider 
time and energy are finite. Under these circumstances, GB 
implementation may cause physicians to favor SCC over 
SCF services in increasing their service volume. We also 
examined the concomitant changes in SCF to answer the fol-
lowing question: Did providers (1) increase their total care 
effort (SCC plus SCF), or (2) sustain their total care effort at 
2000 levels but displace effort to more profitable services, or 
(3) engage in unremitting care escalation of all types to max-
imize their market share of points? Our second research 
question examines the impact of the BNHI service cap policy 
on SCC and SCF volumes. Our study hypotheses were as 
follows:
Hypothesis 1 (2000-2005 changes): In 2005 (post-GB), 
total nationwide SCC points and average points per clinic 
would be higher than in 2000 (pre-GB), and SCF points 
would be lower than in 2000 (tragedy of the commons 
effect).
Hypothesis 2 (2005-2007 changes): In 2007, total SCC 
points would be lower than in 2005, and concurrently 
SCF volumes would increase to pre-GB levels.
Our study controls for market competition in the empiri-
cal specifications used to test both hypotheses. Large urban 
centers with more competitive markets may witness more 
service inducement than less competitive markets in keeping 
with highly competitive attitudes rather than cooperation in 
highly competitive markets. Moreover, in competitive mar-
kets the potential to increase services on the extensive mar-
gin (eg, the number of different patients or office visits) is 
limited whereas it is still possible to increase services on the 
intensive margin (eg, the number and intensity of services 
provided during each consultation). Our study also tests 
whether service provision was restrained in the second period 
in 2007 (post-BNHI enforcement) relative to 2005 (pre-
BNHI enforcement), and whether the service volume change 
was limited to the BNHI-targeted sector (SCC) or accompa-
nied by compensatory increases in the unrestrained service 
sector (SCF).
Materials and Methods
Since the launch of universal coverage, single-payer health 
insurance system in 1995, health insurance coverage in 
Taiwan increased from 56% to more than 90% the following 
year, and to 99.6% for its 23 million people in 2011. Because 
clinics and hospitals are required to document all care pro-
vided to claim reimbursement, the secondary claims data are 
considerably reliable. In the present study, claims data on 
outpatient ophthalmology clinics for the years 2000, 2005, 
and 2007 were used. Clinic sector GB was implemented in 
2001, and the SCC service cap policy was implemented in 
2006. We used 2000 claims data representing the pre-GB 
year, 2005 data representing post-GB, but prior to service 
cap policy period, and 2007 the post–service cap year. The 
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unit of observation is the clinic. Clinics were included in the 
analysis if they were represented in the claims data in all 3 
years.
Eye care falls under the umbrella of the Western medicine 
clinic sector GB, and is reimbursed through SCF and SCC 
mechanisms. SCF applies to most routine outpatient visits 
consuming a standard amount of provider time and up to a 
3-day supply of cost-predictable prescription drugs. A fixed 
fee is reimbursed per SCF claim. SCC applies to non-routine 
care episodes, involving variable provider time or skill, out-
patient procedures involving non-standard care items or 
technology or prescription drugs. SCC claims are required to 
show itemized treatments, consumables, and pharmaceuti-
cals provided. SCC claim amounts are typically higher and 
more profitable than SCF, but because they have to be item-
ized, filing is lengthy and cumbersome.
Outpatient claims of all eye clinics were extracted from the 
NHI’s de-identified claims database. Although clinics in gen-
eral limit services to office visits and minor procedures, oph-
thalmology (unlike most specialties) is amenable to ambulatory 
surgery for many eye conditions. Because of a lack of primary 
care gatekeeping in Taiwan’s health system, patients can 
access any clinic or hospital for care. The NHI Bureau has 
defined 17 medical area networks (health care markets) based 
on geographic contiguity of human settlements and commut-
ing patterns. To calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 
market competition in each market, the total of all eye services 
claims submitted by clinics and hospital outpatient depart-
ments in each medical area network served as the denomina-
tor, and each clinic’s total claims was the numerator.
Policy changes were identified by reviewing the BNHI 
Web site for policies applicable to eye services and through 
interviews with national and regional office-bearers of the 
ophthalmologists’ association. These officers engage with 
the BNHI in policy development and enforcement.
Statistical Analyses
Changes in point volumes were analyzed separately for SCF 
and SCC. The following were used: (1) t test of differences 
in mean claim points per clinic nationwide, and clinic-level 
paired t tests of differences in claimed points between 2000, 
2005, and 2007; (2) paired t tests of differences in clinic 
points within each health care market in the above-mentioned 
3 years; and (3) multilevel modeling with repeated measures 
to model SCF and SCC separately, specifying health care 
market fixed effects. Market fixed effect was used to account 
for health care market characteristics that may affect a pro-
vider behavior.
All clinics with eye care claims in 2000, 2005, and 2007 
were included in the study. Annual SCF and SCC points were 
calculated for each clinic. SCC and SCF claim points were the 
key dependent variables of interest. Key predictor variables 
were market competition level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), clinic type (solo practice, single-specialty group 
practice, and multi-specialty group practice), and geographic 
region (north, south, central, and east). Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) was calculated as the sum of squared market 
shares of the clinics out of the total outpatient eye care pro-
vided in clinics and hospitals in each health care market. A 
higher HHI score indicates lower competition or high market 
concentration, and a lower HHI indicates a highly competitive 
market.
SAS (Version 9.2) was used. Measures of skewness and 
linear regression residual analysis showed violations of nor-
mality of the dependent variables, SCF and SCC. Natural log 
and square-root transformations were tested; the latter 
resulted in a near-normal distribution, suitable for linear 
regression. Square-root transformations of claim points were 
subjected to multiple regression analyses that produced ran-
domly distributed residuals across clinics by size or type 
(without heteroscedasticity) permitting valid inferences.
Results
Table 1 presents the distribution of clinics by type and own-
ership. Approximately 80% of clinics were solo practices, 
mostly for-profit. A total of 418 clinics had SCC claims in all 
3 study years, and 297 clinics had SCF claims in all 3 years. 
Figure 1 and Table 2 show that the nationwide mean SCC 
claim point per clinic in 2005 was higher than in 2000 (paired 
t test, P < .0001). The 2007 claim volume was similar to that 
of 2005 (P = .40). The SCC increase in 2005 was driven by 
significant increases in the highly competitive markers of the 
major metropolitan cities (Taipei, Taichung, Kaohsiung, 
Taoyuan, and Changhwa, points A-E in Figure 2). The 
increase in SCC points followed by stabilization in 2007 at 
the 2005 level is validated by clinic-level paired t tests within 
markets, with the highest increases observed in the above-
mentioned five markets (table not shown).
For SCF, Figure 3 shows that the nationwide claims total 
in 2005 was similar to 2000 and 2007 (health care market-
wise paired t tests, P = .31, and P = .56, respectively; see 
Table 2). The lack of significant difference nationally was 
sustained in within-market analyses (table not shown). Plots 
Table 1. Distribution of Clinics With SCF Claims and SCCs in 2000.
Clinic characteristics
SCF SCC
N (%) N (%)
Clinic type
 Solo practice 229 (77.1) 327 (78.2)
 Single-specialty group 52 (17.5) 67 (16.0)
 Multi-specialty group 16 (5.4) 24 (5.7)
Ownership
 Public and non-profit 9 (3.0) 11 (2.6)
 For-profit 288 (97.0) 407 (97.4)
 Total 297 (100.0) 418 (100.0)
Note. SCF = Simple Claim Form; SCC = Special Case Claim.
Chang et al 5
of clinic means grouped by market against HHI show no sys-
tematic patterns relative to the intensity of competition (see 
Figure 4). The observed year-wise changes in the figure are 
not statistically significant.
Multiple regression analysis results are shown in Table 3. 
The adjusted SCC points were significantly different by 
study year, with 2005 points being higher than 2000 points 
(P < .0001). SCC point volume in 2007 was similar to the 
2005 volume. Multi-specialty group practices claimed sig-
nificantly more points than solo and single-specialty group 
practices (P < .01, and P < .001, respectively). The SCC 
point volume was not associated with market competition 
(P = .06). Interactions between year and competition, year 
and ownership, and competition and ownership were not sig-
nificant. Health care market effect was not significant but was 
retained in both SCF and SCC regression models to account 
for unique market characteristics driving provider behavior.
For SCF, the 2005 and 2007 volumes were similar to 2000 
after accounting for clinic type and ownership. Multi-specialty 
group practices claimed significantly more points than solo 
and single-specialty groups. In addition, for-profit status was 
associated with higher SCF points (both P < .001). Market 
competition was significant, and lower competition was asso-
ciated with higher SCF points. None of the interaction terms 
was significant.
To facilitate conclusions on provider behavior across the 
two service types, Table 4 presents an integrative summary 
of findings and the associated conclusions regarding pro-
vider behavior. Low-revenue, fixed-rate SCF services 
remained constant from pre-GB to early post-GB and late 
post-GB, but SCC increased in 2005 over pre-GB, and was 
sustained at the 2005 level in 2007.
Discussion
Our study documents evidence of increased provision of dis-
cretionary billable, care-intensive services with no change in 
low-revenue services under GB. These findings support that 
Special Case Claim
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Figure 1. Mean Special Case Claim points per eye clinic in Taiwan.
Table 2. Paired t Tests of the Differences in Global Budget Points Claimed by Clinics, Pre-GB, Post-GB but Prior to Service Cap, and 
Post–Service Cap.
 Difference between years (later minus earlier)
Paired t test
Mean difference P value
SCF 2000 vs. 2005 133 107 .312
2005 vs. 2007 −47 550 .560
SCC 2000 vs. 2005 724 952 <.0001
2005 vs. 2007  63 761 .397
Note. GB = global budgeting; SCF = Simple Claim Form; SCC = Special Case Claim.
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Figure 3. Mean Simple Claim Form points per clinic—All clinics in Taiwan.
providers attempt to maximize their individual share of the 
global budget to maintain a target level of income. The BNHI 
responded by co-opting the experts (specialist associations) 
to come up with a realistic cap on discretionary billable ser-
vices using historic data, and enlisted physician cooperation 
for the policy by relying on professional self-regulation to 
enforce the caps. Concurrently, the BNHI promoted aware-
ness of the collective long-term interest of providers served 
by limiting health care costs to NHI premium revenues. The 
strategy was effective, as shown by sustained SCC volumes 
in 2007 at the 2005 level with no further increase.
Viewing SCF and SCC changes concurrently, we observe 
that a constant level of SCF throughout the study period was 
observed, concurrent with an increase in SCC during the 
unregulated post-GB period until 2005. This finding is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that providers seek to maintain a target 
level of income, and, in the context of global budgets, respond 
by increasing discretionary billable SCC procedures to maxi-
mize their individual share of the region’s budget. Moreover, in 
2007, providers limited SCC volumes to the 2005 level, consis-
tent with the goals of the policy-enforced caps.
One could question why SCF volumes remained at pre-
GB levels in the post-GB years despite the incentive to pro-
vide more services. Unlike industrial production, capacity for 
producing medical services is limited by the specialist’s fixed 
time resource. The observed increase in SCC with no changes 
0
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Figure 2. Mean SCC points per clinic in each medical care market represented by the HHI level.
Note. SCC = Special Case Claim.
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in SCF is consistent with providers using available additional 
time (and patients) to produce higher revenue yielding ser-
vices. Subsequently, the stagnation of SCC service volumes 
in 2007 without concurrent increases in SCF may attest to 
near saturation of providers’ time resource, and the poor 
incentive to invest extra effort in more SCF services given its 
low reimbursement rate. Consistent with our conceptual 
framework, SCC volume increases were particularly high in 
highly competitive markets. Another important finding con-
sistent with a conclusion of incentive-driven provider behav-
ior is that for-profit entities show higher volumes relative to 
public and non-profit clinics. This is especially notable with 
SCF claims. In addition, confounding between clinic type and 
ownership may be allowing clinic type to capture some of the 
ownership effect in respect of SCC claims. Higher SCF claim 
volume by for-profit clinics suggests some unnecessary ser-
vices provided, reflecting possible social welfare loss, as well 
as the limitations of public policy in improving market effi-
ciency beyond a point.
One potential confounding factor could be changing 
demographic composition over time, particularly population 
aging, and differential changes across markets. Mitigating 
this concern is the policy of the NHI Bureau, to allocate the 
national global budget cap among the six NHI administrative 
regions by adjusting for regional demographic composition, 
using a complex, historic utilization-based algorithm.13 Thus, 
all clinics within a region face the same cap and the same 
demographic distribution, the demand-side variable. We 
used the HHI index of market competition to adjust for the 
role of supply-demand dynamics within a market. Data on 
demographic distributions within each HHI region are not 
available, and HHI regions are not contiguous with the NHI 
administrative regions. Inability to adjust for demographic 
composition is a study limitation. However, a review of the 
overall population change in Taiwan during the study period 
reveals patterns that support our conclusions.
The appendix table shows the age-sex distribution of 
Taiwan’s population in the 3 study years. The population 
aged above 50 years has the highest risk of eye disease and 
degenerative conditions, accounting for the most demand for 
eye care services worldwide.19,20 This age group increased 
from 20.7% of the 2000 population to 24.9% of a slightly 
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Figure 4. Mean SCF points per clinic in each medical care market represented by the HHI level.
Note. M represents Hualien that had no SCF cases claimed; therefore, it does not appear. SCF = Simple Claim Form.
Table 3. Adjusted Associations Between Eye Care Volume and 
GB Policies, Year 2000 (Pre-GB), 2005 (Post-GB but Pre–SCC 
Service Cap), and 2007 (Post–SCC Service Cap).
SCC SCF
Intercept 1099.4*** 546.63**
Year
 2005 Reference Reference
 2000 −204.80*** −19.60
 2007 21.30 −18.30
Clinic type
 Solo Reference Reference
 Single-specialty group 240.02** 86.89
 Multi-specialty group 505.91*** 578.11***
Ownership
 Public or non-profit Reference Reference
 For-profit 45.82 1547.1***
HHI 0.06 0.18***
Note. Geographic region is collinear with the HHI area and hence 
removed from the model. GB = global budgeting; SCC = Special Case 
Claim; SCF = Simple Claim Form.
* P < .05. **P < .01. ***P < .001.
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larger 2005 population, and 26.7% of the 2007 population. 
This represents a 20% increase between the pre-GB and 
post-GB, pre–SCC cap periods, and further by 7.3% between 
the pre–SCC cap and the post–SCC cap years. These 
increases were accompanied by a 2.5% increase in 2005 SCF 
claims over the 2000 level (133 107 mean points increase in 
2005 over the 2000 mean clinic points of ~5 360 000, see 
Table 2 and Figure 3) and a 37.1% increase in SCC claims 
(724 952 increase over the 2000 mean clinic total of 
1 950 000 points, see Table 2 and Figure 1). The observed 
changes in service volumes relative to at-risk population vol-
umes reflect that clinics disproportionately increased the 
high-revenue SCC services relative to the increase in at-risk 
population. Concurrently, there was a disproportionately low 
(statistically negligible) change in SCF claims. These find-
ings support our conclusions.
In summary, provider behavior is found to be consistent 
with the predictions of the tragedy of the commons theory 
under global budget constraints concurrent with a fee-for-
service reimbursement system. First, SCC volume increased 
while SCF volume remained constant from 2000 to 2005. 
Then, following the imposition of volume controls on SCC 
as a percentage of a clinic’s total claimed points in 2005 and 
2006, the growth in SCC service volumes stopped between 
2005 and 2007.
Our findings suggest that in global budget environments, 
payers should monitor all the relevant service categories with 
potential for substitution. For example, a study in Germany 
showed that the apparent savings from implementing a phar-
maceutical sector GB were actually transferred to other service 
areas (patient referral to specialists or hospitals that had no such 
caps), resulting in higher total costs to the health system.21
The current study also shows that combating service dis-
tortions resulting from perverse economic incentives under 
global budgets remains a difficult challenge for insurance 
administrators. To expect physicians to self-regulate and 
constrain services to the level of the population’s need is 
unrealistic when economic incentives promote a game- 
theoretic tragedy of the commons outcome. Future studies 
should address whether payers can permit the floating point 
value to fall as service volume rises without endangering the 
population’s health status. To meet these diverse goals, pay-
ers need to regulate specific types of service in partnership 
with medical experts and professional associations.
The findings of the present study are consistent with the 
experimental results of an earlier study. The impact of expen-
diture caps and expenditure targets on hypothetical service 
volumes were tested in a college classroom game.22 Under 
both mechanisms, the objective was to keep the total expendi-
ture equal to the total premiums collected during the current 
year. In the expenditure target experiment, each student (hypo-
thetically a physician) was assigned to perform at fixed fee 
rates a fixed quota of services. If their actual services deviated 
from the quota, their individual fees were proportionately 
adjusted. Under the alternative mechanism of the expenditure 
cap, a total monetary budget was established across all players 
for a given period, without individual quotas. Each player was 
reimbursed at a common unit price determined by the total 
budget divided by the aggregate points accumulated by all 
players. Students responded to the collective expenditure cap 
(similar to Taiwan’s GB) with higher service volumes than 
under an expenditure target. Thus, players maximized income 
under an individual expenditure target by controlling service 
production. However, under a collective expenditure cap, each 
player has no control over other players’ response, and they 
respond by maximizing market share by over-providing ser-
vices, even if doing so reduces the marginal income for each 
item of service provided.
Table 4. Summary of Eye Care Provider Behavior Under Global Budgets.
Change in 2005 over 2000 Change in 2007 over 2005
SCF No change No change
SCC Increased No change
Conclusion •   SCC shows tragedy of the commons effect. But SCF did not 
show a concurrent decrease. Therefore, overall volume of 
services increased
•   SCC shows no change from 2005 to 2007 due 
to the implementation of NHI regulation and 
associated penalties for oversupply of SCC 
services
 •   Overall therefore, provider behavior is consistent with the 
tragedy of the commons effect of GB
•   SCF that is not regulated by NHI remained 
constant in 2007 relative to 2005 (and 2000), 
indicating that the increase in services observed 
in 2005 over 2000 remains sustained in 2007
Overall conclusion Despite SCF volume remaining constant throughout, the overall data support a tragedy of the commons effect 
of GB, attributable to providers selectively increasing higher revenue yielding SCC services until 2005 and then 
keeping the SCC service volume constant following policy intervention. Providers did not alter their SCF volume as 
the points generated by SCF visits are low and fixed
Note. SCF = Simple Claim Form; SCC = Special Case Claim; GB = global budgeting.
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Conclusions
Our study extends the findings of earlier studies from Taiwan 
that showed increases in overall service volumes with GB 
(increased inpatient volumes following hospital GB,5,15 and 
increased outpatient volumes following clinic sector GB16). We 
explored service volume and composition changes within a 
single specialty, and found evidence of displacement of pro-
vider efforts to more profitable services. Furthermore, our study 
finds that co-option of professional associations is effective for 
regulating medical services. The study does not, however, 
establish whether the observed increases are welfare enhancing 
(increasing patient utility) or socially harmful (iatrogenic harm 
from unnecessary services). Future studies should focus on the 
health outcome impact of Taiwan’s global budgets.
Appendix
Population Distribution by Age and Gender in Taiwan, 2000, 2005, 
2007 (% of Total).
Age (years) Gender 2000 Pre-GB
2005 Post-GB 
and pre–
service cap
2007 
Post–service 
cap
0-10 Male 7.27 6.07 5.49
Female 6.67 5.56 5.02
10-20 Male 8.06 7.31 7.34
Female 7.53 6.75 6.76
20-30 Male 8.66 8.67 8.20
Female 8.31 8.31 7.88
30-40 Male 8.74 8.10 8.12
Female 8.45 7.94 8.05
40-50 Male 7.90 8.26 8.25
Female 7.74 8.13 8.15
50-60 Male 4.29 5.84 6.49
Female 4.30 5.89 6.59
60-70 Male 3.17 3.16 3.22
Female 3.24 3.41 3.47
70-80 Male 2.39 2.41 2.34
Female 1.92 2.27 2.41
>80 Male 0.65 0.95 1.10
Female 0.70 0.95 1.09
 Total % 100.00 100.00 100.00
 Population 22 276 672 22 770 383 22 958 360
Note. GB = global budgeting.
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